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The election of President Mattarella is a turning point in Matteo Renzi’s attempt to reform
the constitution. This choice determined the loss of Forza Italia’s support to the constitu-
tional reform, thus leaving the Renzi cabinet and the Democratic Party alone on the
Yes-side. Our goal is to assess the degree of Renzi’s misjudgment by comparing two
theoretical perspectives on voting behavior in direct-democratic settings through a nested
design. Our results highlight that vote choices can be explained by both the systematic and
the heuristic modes of information processing. Respondents’ agreement with the content of
the reform (systematic mode) and a positive evaluation of the Renzi cabinet (heuristic mode)
are key predictors of Yes vote. Instead, the negative assessment of the economic situation is
a crucial driver of No vote. Lastly, we build a bridge between these two perspectives by
showing that partisan attachments conditioned the effect of respondents’ content evaluation
on voting behavior.
Keywords: Italy; referendum; voting behavior; prime minister; political parties
Introduction
On 4 December 2016 Italian citizens were called to vote on a wide-ranging con-
stitutional reform in a conﬁrmatory referendum. The reform bill entailed several
constitutional modiﬁcations regarding the abolishment of perfect bicameralism, a
signiﬁcant reduction in the number ofMPs in the Senate, the re-centralization of key
regional policy competences, the abolishment of provinces, as well as the lowering
of the quorum for abrogative referendums. Reform proponents maintained that it
was designed to increase government stability and to slim the legislative process.
Detractors argued that the reformwould give too much power to the prime minister
(PM), thus harming the role of the Parliament (De Angelis et al., 2017).
However, policy arguments on the prospective equilibrium among the powers of
the state did not prevail in the public debate concerning the 2016 Italian constitu-
tional referendum. In fact, PM Matteo Renzi referred to this constitutional reform
as the most important piece of legislation in the entire legislature. Moreover, he
initially promised to step down in case of rejection, the survival of his government
depending on a positive referendum outcome.
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This strong personalization of the referendum campaign pushed the alignment
of political parties along a sharp government/opposition line. The majority
of the Democratic Party’s (PD) frontbenchers1 (Fasano et al., 2017) and
their smaller coalition partner New Center Right (NCD) supported the
reform, whereas all the opposition parties stood by the No-side because they
saw a promising opportunity to get rid of their political adversary Renzi. Among
opposition parties, the strategic behavior of the center-right party Forza Italia
(Go Italy – FI) deserves mention. In fact, FI leader Silvio Berlusconi withdrew
his endorsement to the constitutional reform after the almost unilateral election
of Sergio Mattarella as President of the Italian Republic at the hands of the PD.
With the provocative title of this paper, ‘Was the election of President Mattarella
worth the trouble?,’ we argue that PM Renzi openly renounced the political
support of FI to the constitutional reform in order to obtain the election of
President Mattarella.
Wemaintain that the 2016 Italian constitutional referendum is an interesting case
to investigate citizens’ decision-making processes in direct-democratic settings. In
fact, from a policy point of view, the constitutional reform was a highly complex
package of funding provisions, whose consequences on policymaking and the state
of the economy might have appeared uncertain to citizens. From a political point of
view, the reform was immediately tied to the survival of the Renzi cabinet, a fact
that increased its salience in the eyes of citizens. The Renzi cabinet openly bet
everything on a positive referendum outcome, political parties took clear-cut posi-
tions and Italian media hosted several and intensive debates on the topic, making
information widely and easily available.
These conditions make the 2016 constitutional referendum a good setting to
investigate a key question: when citizens take part in a referendum, do they vote
according to their evaluations on the policy at stake or do they cast their ballots
according to peripheral dynamics and heuristics? This paper builds on the existing
literature on voting behavior in direct-democratic settings by comparing the role
played by the so-called ‘systematic’ and ‘heuristic’modes of information processing
(e.g. Lodge and Taber, 2013; Taber and Young, 2013) in the Italian case. To clarify,
the systematic form of decision-making maintains that voters collect information
accurately and examine policy arguments critically in order to decide how to cast
their ballots. The ‘heuristic’ mode, on the other hand, argues that under low
information and in presence of conﬂicting views on the object of vote, citizens act
rationally and employ heuristics, such as parties’ positions (Hobolt, 2006; Borges
and Clarke, 2008), and cognitive shortcuts, such as trust in government (Kriesi,
2005; Clarke et al., 2013) and evaluations of the state of the economy (Hobolt,
2016), to ground their vote choices.
1 The PD was internally split into minority leftist factions opposing the reform and the mainstream
faction supporting the reform (e.g. Sentimeter, 2015; Fasano et al., 2017). This intra-party heterogeneity led
to a party ﬁssion in February 2017.
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We compare these two approaches by using a nested logit model (McFadden, 1978;
Born, 1990; Thurner and Eymann, 2000) on the data provided by the ITANES
Referendum Questionnaire (2016).2 In fact, this technique allows us to model vote
choice as a sequential process, namely by considering that at any given point in time
only a subset of the alternative is actually available (Steenbergen, 2008: 162).
The results highlight that voting behavior at the 2016 constitutional referendum
can be explained by both respondents’ evaluation of the content of the reform
(systematic mode) and by cognitive shortcuts (heuristic mode). In detail, respon-
dents’ agreement with the content of the reform (systematic mode) and a positive
evaluation of the Renzi cabinet (heuristic mode) are key predictors of Yes vote.
However, they are unable to explain the choice of voting No. Instead, the heuristics
related to the assessment of the economic situation and partisan attachments played
key roles. The worse the respondent’s assessment of the economic situation is, the
more he/she is likely to vote No. Lastly, the more the respondent is ready to vote
for FI or the Five Star Movement (M5S), the more he/she is likely to reject the
constitutional reform. These partisan attachments are so strong that they could even
condition the positive effect of content evaluation on the probability to vote Yes.
The article is structured as follows. The next section motivates the focus on the 2016
constitutional referendum by providing key information on Italian politics. Then,
we review the literature on voting behavior in direct-democratic settings and
formulate our research hypotheses. Last, we describe the data set and the model
speciﬁcation. The analytical section displays the results.
The political context around the 2016 Italian constitutional referendum
The use of a referendum for constitutional amendments, either as an absolute
requirement or as an optional alternative, is common to several countries (Lijphart,
2012). Referendums are usually prescribed in addition to legislative approval by
simple or qualiﬁed majority, making constitutional amendments harder to adopt
(Gallagher, 1995).
Italy is an interesting case as the use of referendum represents an ‘alternative
method’ to approve a constitutional reform without the qualiﬁed majority in
Parliament. In fact, a constitutional reform approved by legislators with the mere
simple majority can only be adopted if it obtains the support of the majority of
Italian voters in a popular referendum without quorum (see art. 138 Cost.). Thus,
former PMRenzi had two alternative paths: either reaching the qualiﬁedmajority in
Parliament with the key support of the center-right party FI or approving the reform
with the simple majority, thus betting on his ability to mobilize the electorate in the
conﬁrmatory referendum.
Of course, each path implies different strategies. Reaching the qualiﬁed majority
in both Chambers requires reform proponents to ﬁnd a large parliamentary
2 Available at: http://www.itanes.org/questionari-itanes/
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support. We call this strategy ‘consensual strategy.’ Reaching the simple majority
plus winning a referendum asks instead reform proponents to bet on the support of
the majority of voters. We call this strategy ‘popular vote strategy.’
But what makes one of the two strategies more likely to succeed? If we look back to
the history of constitutional reforms in Italy, consensual strategies seem to have been
more successful. In fact, major attempts to reform the Italian constitution (i.e. the Bozzi
Bicameral Committee in 1983–1985, the De Mita-Iotti Bicameral Committee in
1992–1994, and the D’Alema Bicameral Committee in 1997) got sunk in Parliament
under the conﬂicts between government and opposition parties (Ferrera and Gualmini,
2004). In its attempt to reform the constitution in 2006, the center-right coalition led by
FI leader Berlusconi decided to rely on the strength of its parliamentary majority only
(Bull and Newell, 2009). Thus, the subsequent conﬁrmatory referendum saw the
unanimous mobilization of center-left parties and the constitutional reform was rejec-
ted in popular vote. On the contrary, opposition parties were muchmore divided in the
2001 constitutional reform, which was proposed by the center-left coalition and was
ﬁnally adopted through a popular referendum (Keating and Wilson, 2010).3
According to Tsebelis (2002, 2017), it is impossible to establish a priori which
strategy (i.e. consensual strategy vs. popular vote strategy) is more likely to succeed
in changing the status quo (i.e. in reforming the constitution) because the con-
stitutional core (i.e. the set of provisions that can never be changed) depends on the
actual preferences of the actors involved. The key difference between the two stra-
tegies is that the popular vote introduces an additional veto player, that is to say the
population, with its own preferences.
With regards to the 2016 constitutional referendum, Tsebelis claimed that the
popular vote strategy chosen by Renzi was more likely to succeed than the con-
sensual strategy because Italian voters were more prone to reduce the power of the
Senate (and the numbers of MPs) rather than the Senators’ (Tsebelis, 2017: 8).
However, Tsebelis’s argument requires citizens to manifest clear preferences on
the content of the constitutional reform and to take part in a referendum to express
their sincere opinions (systematic mode). Vice versa, referendums are often descri-
bed in the literature as ‘second order elections,’ where citizens simply take the
chance to express their judgments on contextual elements (e.g. Reif and Schmitt,
1980), such as the economic situation, the performance of the incumbent govern-
ment and the political élites (heuristic mode).
The election of Mattarella as President of the Republic in January 2015 without
the agreement of FI is a turning point in the history of the 2016 constitutional
3 In that case, the main opposition parties (amongst them FI, National Alliance-AN, and the Northern
League-NL) did not vote openly against the reform, but chose not to participate to the parliamentary vote.
Then, the reform gained the open support of prominent members of FI (as the governor of Lombardy
Region, Roberto Formigoni, and the governor of Puglia Region, Raffaele Fitto) in the subsequent con-
ﬁrmatory referendum. Moreover, LN leader Umberto Bossi openly put pressure on his party voters to
abstain, rather than voting No, in the referendum.
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referendum. Essentially, Renzi broke the political agreement he had signed 1 year
before with FI leader Berlusconi,4 thus abruptly dismissing the consensual strategy
in favor of the popular vote strategy. More interestingly, by breaking up with
Berlusconi, Renzi decided to give up FI’s support in the subsequent conﬁrmatory
referendum: he chose to undertake the referendum on his own, with the support of
his cabinet and his party (i.e. the PD) only.
The infringement of this pact in order to elect President Mattarella has been
labeled by the large majority of Italian media as ‘Renzi’s political masterpiece’ (e.g.
La Stampa, Il Corriere della Sera, Il Foglio, and Hufﬁngton Post). Almost 3 years
later, after losing the referendum and, consequently, the premiership, a simple
question comes to mind: was the election of President Mattarella worth the trouble?
In retrospect, it is rather easy to provide a negative answer. However, in the winter
of 2015 Renzi chose to place a bet on his popularity, the positive evaluation of his
cabinet, and the strength of his party. Was this choice what Homer would have
called an act of hybris? To assess the degree of Renzi’s misjudgment, we need to
understand which cognitive mechanisms drove the vote choices of citizens at the
2016 constitutional referendum.
Systematic vs. heuristic reasoning in referendums: literature review and
hypotheses
On 4 December 2016, Italian citizens casted their ballots on a far-reaching con-
stitutional reform in a referendum vote without quorum. Ideally, their voting
behavior should have been based on an informed judgement on the policy content
of the issue at stake (e.g. Lupia and Matsusaka, 2004; Kriesi, 2005; Hobolt, 2007).
That is to say, they were meant to be collecting accurate information, critically
evaluate the pros and cons and, ﬁnally, come to an informed vote choice.
According to recent studies, this systematic mode of information processing is not
as uncommon as one might think. In fact, voters are increasingly aware of the main
policy arguments of the campaign (Colombo, 2016) and they often rely on policy
arguments to make their vote choices, when and if these argument are available
(Boudreau and MacKenzie, 2014; Colombo and Kriesi, 2016). Thus, we formulate
our ﬁrst hypothesis:
HYPOTHESIS 1: The more voters agree with the policy content of the constitutional
reform, the more (less) they are likely to vote Yes (No) at the
referendum.
However, since the average level of interest in politics and political knowledge tend
to be rather low, individuals are not naturally inclined to invest their time in
4 This agreement, known as the ‘Nazareno Pact,’ was signed by Renzi and Berlusconi on 18 January
2014. Even if its content was kept private, the agreement widely concerned the reform of the electoral law
and of the constitution.
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collecting ‘encyclopedic’ political information (Lupia, 1994). The so-called dual
process models of reasoning state that individuals follow the least-effort principle,
that is they aim at reaching a vote choice that reﬂects their policy preferences as best as
possible by minimizing informational and cognitive efforts (e.g. Kahneman, 2011).
Besides, the 2016 constitutional reform included a package of such complex funding
provisions that even the most informed and motivated individuals could not fully
grasp its overall consequences. In such circumstances, individuals may resort to peri-
pheral considerations and cognitive shortcuts as substitutes for policy considerations
to reach a reasonable vote choice (e.g. Lupia andMcCubbins, 1998: 2). This decision-
making strategy is labeled ‘heuristic mode of information processing’ (Lupia et al.,
2000; Kriesi, 2005).
Since Fiorina (1981), scholars have underlined the key role played by the economic
situation in shaping voting behavior. In a nutshell, if the economy is doing well, citizens
are more likely to vote for governing parties, while if the economy is going poorly,
citizens tend to punish incumbents (e.g. Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2007). This
mechanism also works in the stance of referendums: citizens may punish (reward)
governing parties for their performance in the economic sphere by rejecting (accepting)
their reform proposal. For example, the economic conditions experienced by British
people were key drivers of the vote in the 2016 Brexit referendums (Hobolt, 2016).We
argue that this mechanism may have played a role in our case study as well. To
emphasize this simpliﬁcation of voters’ reasoning, we could assert that if the govern-
ment has managed the economy badly (well), the constitutional reform which was
formulated and supported by the same government will also be likely to be badly (well)
written. Thus, we formulate our second hypothesis:
HYPOTHESIS 2: The worse the voters’ retrospective evaluation of the economic
situation, the less (more) they are likely to vote Yes (No) at the
referendum.
Similarly, voters’ behavior in referendums may be affected by their assessments of
the overall performance of the cabinet: ceteris paribus, a reform supported by a
popular cabinet is more likely to be approved (Gallagher, 2015: 282). Of course,
citizens’ degree of approval towards the cabinet may be driven by both policy and
valence issues (Stokes, 1963). For example, it is claimed that President Mitterand’s
unpopularity nearly caused the defeat of the Maastricht Treaty referendum in
France in 1992, while the personal popularity of the PM Gonzalez ensured that the
Spanish cast their vote to stay in the NATO in 1986 (LeDuc, 2003). Accordingly, we
formulate our third hypothesis:
HYPOTHESIS 3: The better voters evaluate the incumbent government, the more
(less) they are likely to vote Yes (No) at the referendum.
This mechanism is likely to have played a leading role in our case study. PM Renzi
linked the fate of his government to the approval of the constitutional reform from
the very beginning, thus transforming the referendum into a verdict on his
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personality. A survey experiment hints that this strategy may have been counter-
productive: indeed, voters’ support for the reform weakens when it is explicitly
linked to the government (Colombo et al., 2016).
Moreover, when confronted with complex policy decisions, citizens may rely on
signals from trusted political parties, partisan attachments and feelings (e.g.
Slothuus and de Vreese, 2010). Indeed, citizens are in lack of time, interest and
cognitive capacity to evaluate the possible consequences of accepting or rejecting a
referendum proposal (Borges and Clarke, 2008: 437; Clarke et al., 2004: 346).
Thus, following party recommendations can be an important heuristic helping
citizens to determine what information is trustworthy (Hobolt, 2009: 35–7; Lupia
and McCubbins, 1998). However, empirical evidences on partisan effects are not
clear-cut (e.g. de Vreese, 2006; Neijens and van Praag, 2006).
Since the majority of the PD frontbenchers campaigned for the Yes-side (together
with the small NCD party), while all the other parties (i.e. FI, M5S, and Northern
League – LN) stood by the No-side, we expect that:
HYPOTHESIS 4A: The closer voters are to the PD, the more (less) they are likely to
vote Yes (No) at the referendum.
HYPOTHESIS 4B: The closer voters are to FI, the less (more) they are likely to vote Yes
(No) at the referendum.
HYPOTHESIS 4C: The closer voters are to the M5S, the less (more) they are likely to
vote Yes (No) at the referendum.
HYPOTHESIS 4D: The closer voters are to LN, the less (more) they are likely to vote
Yes (No) at the referendum.
The hypotheses listed so far will guide us in the learning of whether Italian voters in
the 2016 constitutional referendum were driven mainly by substantive information
about the content of the constitutional reform (Hypothesis 1) or whether peripheral
dynamics (i.e. retrospective economic evaluation, the popularity of the Renzi cabi-
net and partisan attachments) prevailed (Hypotheses 2–4). Identifying the main
drivers of voters’ choices in direct-democratic settings is crucial as they affect the
quality of democratic decisions indeed.
However, this paper takes a step forward in order to understand whether peripheral
dynamics also have a conditioning effect on the impact of substantive policy con-
siderations on voting behavior. Was a negative evaluation of the economy (heuristic
mode) able to nullify the effect of a positive evaluation of the complex provisions
embedded in the constitutional reform (systematic mode)? Else, did a positive evalua-
tion of the Renzi cabinet contain the effect of a skeptical content evaluation (systematic
mode)? Finally, did Italian voters conform too readily to the views of their trusted
parties (heuristic mode) even at the cost of neglecting their opinions on the issue at stake
(systematic mode)? The empirical analysis described in the next section will help us test
the hypotheses and answer these additional questions.
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Research design
Data and operationalization
The empirical analysis is based on the 2016 ITANES Referendum Questionnaire. This
survey is performed on a representative sample of Italian citizens. Each respondent was
interviewed both before and after the 2016 constitutional referendum.When available,
independent variables are built from data collected before the election day to rule out
endogeneity concerns (see Appendix Table A1 for details).
The empirical analysis employs a nested logit model to operationalize respon-
dent’s choice as a sequential process (McFadden, 1978; see the next section for
details in the model speciﬁcation). A data set suitable for standard discrete choice
models provides one observation for each individual. On the opposite, a data set
suitable for the nested model speciﬁcation shows one observation for each alter-
native within each individual and a multi-categorical dependent variable to indicate
whether the alternative is chosen or not (0–1). On 4December, each respondent had
three alternatives: abstention, No vote, and Yes vote.5Thus, we shaped the original
data set so that it shows all three observations for each respondent. Then, we built
the multi-categorical dependent variable Voting Behavior to code respondent’s
choice probabilities to take part in the 2016 constitutional referendum and to
express an eligible vote. If a respondent did not take part in the 2016 referendum,
Voting Behavior is equal to 1 for the alternative abstention, 0 otherwise. If a
respondent took part in the 2016 referendum and voted No (Yes), Voting Behavior
is equal to 1 for the alternative No (Yes) vote, 0 otherwise.
Hypothesis 1 maintains that voters took their ﬁnal decisions in the 2016 con-
stitutional referendum according to a systematic mode of information processing.
We test this claim through an additive index labeled Content Evaluation. It is given
by respondent’s judgment on the overall reform and on ﬁve speciﬁc topics (i.e. the
abolishment of provinces, the abolishment of perfectly symmetric bicameralism, the
re-centralization of energy and infrastructure domains, the lowering of the quorum
for abrogative referendums and the reduction of MPs in the Senate). This index
ranges from 0 (very negative evaluation) to 10 (very positive evaluation).
Besides, Hypotheses 2–4 argue that three heuristics affected voting behavior:
namely, respondent’s negative evaluation of the economy, respondent’s positive
evaluation of the Renzi cabinet and respondent’s political attachments.
The ordinal variable Evaluation Economy captures respondent’s opinion on the
state of the national economy over the last year. It ranges from 0 (very positive
evaluation) to 10 (very negative evaluation).
Similarly, the ordinal variable Evaluation Renzi Cabinet measures respondent’s
opinion on the overall performance of the Renzi cabinet. It ranges from 0 (very
negative evaluation) to 10 (very positive evaluation).
5 Blank ballot is omitted due to small sample size.
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As for partisan attachments, we use respondent’s propensity to vote for the four
largest Italian parties (i.e. PD,M5S, FI, and LN) on a 0–10 scale. Unfortunately, this
item is only available in the post-referendum wave, thus we cannot rule out endo-
geneity concerns completely. However, the party displaying the highest propensity
to be voted usually coincides with the party (or the coalition of parties) chosen by
the respondent at the 2014 European Parliament Elections.6Therefore, the internal
validity of this measure appears to be conﬁrmed (this strategy has been followed by
Camatarri and Segatti, 2017 too).
Lastly, since the effort people are willing to put into an informed vote choice
depends on their motivation and ability (De Angelis et al., 2017), we were prompted
to assess respondent’s political involvement and level of education.
The additive index Political Involvement takes into account respondent’s pro-
pensity to discuss politics with relatives, friends, and colleagues, to gather infor-
mation on Italian politics and the constitutional reform from both media and new
media, and their direct involvement in the electoral campaign.
The ordinal variable Education is equal to 1 if respondents have no educational
degree or an elementary degree; 2 if they earned a junior high school degree; 3 if they
ﬁnished high school and 4 if they have a university degree or higher.
Labor market status, age cohorts and gender are controlled for. Appendix
Tables A1 and A2 provide descriptions and summary statistics.7
Model speciﬁcation
We test the listed hypotheses through a nested logit model. It is a probabilistic
choice model formulated by the Nobel Prize McFadden (1978) to operationalize
choice as a sequential process. Decisionmakers are assumed to be utility maximizers
that evaluate the alternatives in consecutive steps. Therefore, the model is especially
suitable for modeling decision-making processes in which, from a certain time on,
only a subset of alternatives is still available.8
Probabilistic choice models maintain that utility contains two systematic compo-
nents and one random component. Systematic components include the attributes of the
decision maker and those of the alternatives. The random component consists of
unobserved attributes of the alternative, unobserved attributes of the decision maker,
measurement error, and proxies or instrumental variables (Manski, 1977). Due to the
random component, utility maximization and consequently choice are probabilistic.
Usually, probabilistic choice models (e.g. Lucean-type models; Luce, 1959) make
rather stringent assumptions about the random component of the utility. In fact,
they assume that the property of independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) is
6 Note that we cannot employ respondents’ vote choices in the 2014 EU elections because there is scarce data.
Moreover, we need a continuous variable for the nested-logit model (see the sub-section Model Speciﬁcation).
7 The wording of the ITANES’s variables can be found at: http://www.itanes.org/questionari-itanes/
8 This section is based on the following sources: Born (1990), Train (2007), Thurner and Eymann
(2000), and Steenbergen (2008).
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fulﬁlled, meaning that the random component of the utility should be identically
distributed, independent, and homoscedastic. Instead, the nested logit model relaxes
this assumption.
In a nested logit model, the researcher establishes the nesting structure, namely
how many groups (nests) are included and which alternatives belong to which nest.
Each nest should feature a subset of more similar options.
Our decision tree groups the alternatives in two nests (abstention) and (Yes vote,
No vote).9 We maintain that the property of belonging to the same nest is due to
temporal considerations: the will to cast one’s vote precedes the decision of voting
Yes or No. Indeed, since the constitutional referendum did not request the quorum,
abstention cannot be seen as a strategic choice. Only if respondents participate
voting Yes or No becomes relevant.
There are three alternatives in the structure of Figure 1: 1= abstention; 2=Yes
vote, 3=No vote. Let Yq= 1, 2, 3 be the observed choice for decision maker q.
Under a utility maximization assumption, Yq= i if Uqi>Uqj ∀ j≠ i. For instance,
Yq= 2 if Uq2>Uq3 and Uq2>Uq1. We assume that for decision maker q, the utility of
alternative i is conceptualized as random, consisting of a systematic component
(Vqi) and a random component (εq):
Uqi=Vqi + εqi
Vqi is a function of explanatory variables and parameters to be estimated and εqi a
random error term that captures the unobserved attributes of the utility. If
Abstention Participation
Did Not
Vote
YES
Vote
NO
Vote
Figure 1 Decision tree.
9 Blank ballot is omitted due to small sample size.
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explanatory variables involve characteristics of the individual making the choice,
the variable assumes the form of the individual characteristics interacted with
alternative-speciﬁc dummy variables (Born, 1990).
The nested logit model assumes that the errors of similar alternatives are corre-
lated, while the errors of dissimilar alternatives are constrained at 0. Since alter-
natives 2 and 3 are similar, and indeed they are grouped in the same nest, then εq2
and εq3 are correlated. Instead, alternatives 1 and 2 are dissimilar, therefore εq1 and
εq2 are uncorrelated.
In addition, error terms are assumed to follow a Gumbel’s Type B extreme value
distribution (Born, 1990). Resulting choice probabilities are of the following type:
π1 =
exp V1ð Þ
exp V1ð Þ +
P3
j= 2ðexpðVj = λ2Þ
! "λ2
and
π2 = π3 =
expðV2 = λ2Þ
expðV3 = λ2Þ
The π1 equation represents the marginal probability of abstaining rather than
voting for any option.
The π2/π3 equation represents individual conditional probability of voting Yes, given
that he/she chose to participate to the referendum. The relative choice probabilities
between alternatives 2 and 3 are entirely given by the utilities of those alternatives. No
other alternative inﬂuences the likelihood of voting Yes or No. This would be true even
adding other alternatives to the nest. In other words, for any two alternatives in the
same nest, the ratio of probabilities is independent from the existence of other alter-
natives in the same nest: the IIA assumption holds within each nest. Conversely, for any
two alternatives in different nests, the IIA assumption does not hold.
λ is a measure of the degree of independence in unobserved utility among the alter-
natives in a choice subset and it is called ‘dissimilarity parameter’. In π2/π3 equation,
λ2 is the dissimilarity parameter for the choices in the second nest (Yes vote, No vote).
A high λ means greater independence and less correlation. A value of λ of 1 means
complete independence in the nest. If λ is equal to 1 for all nests, the nested logit would
collapse into the standard logit model. In our case study, a value of λ of 1 for all nests
would mean that the options Yes voting and No voting are interchangeable with the
choice of abstaining. Conversely, a value of λ of 0 would entail suggest the presence of
separate decisions on whether and what to vote for. Testing the distance of λ from 0
determines the appropriateness of the choice of a nested logit model.
Results
Table 1 displays the nested logit predictors for the 2016 constitutional referendum
vote choice.
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First, we verify whether it is possible to validate the hypothesized nested struc-
ture. The nested logit speciﬁcation is appropriate if 0< λ< 1. In our case, the like-
lihood ratio test rejects the null hypothesis that all the dissimilarity parameter
coefﬁcients have value 1 at the 95% level (P= 0.029).
Then the results may be interpreted beginning with the bottom-level alternatives:
Yes vote and No vote. The outcome of the estimation process displays choice
probabilities and not choices per se (Hensher et al., 2005: 326).
The evaluation of the content of the constitutional reform is a crucial determinant
of voting behavior. The estimates suggest that the more a respondent agrees with the
content of the reform, the more he/she is likely to vote Yes. This ﬁnding is consistent
with Hypothesis 1 and conﬁrms that the systematic mode of information processing
plays an important role. However, the effect of the predictor Content Evaluation
does not reach statistical signiﬁcance on the probability of voting No, suggesting
that the mechanisms behind Yes vote and No vote do not match. Indeed, respon-
dents that voted No on 4 December 2016 did not seem to be driven by a systematic
mode of information processing.
According to the heuristic mode of information processing, peripheral dynamics
and cognitive shortcuts provided by the government and trusted parties affect
citizens’ voting behavior in direct-democratic settings.
In our case study, the retrospective evaluation of the economic situation strongly
inﬂuenced respondents’ vote choices. The predictor Evaluation Economy, which
Table 1. Vote choice in the 2016 Italian constitutional referendum – nested logit model
Abstention Yes No
Vote choice (Yes/No)
Content evaluation – 0.387 (0.066)*** −0.055 (0.046)
Evaluation economy – −0.308 (0.076)*** 0.121 (0.055)**
Evaluation Renzi cabinet – 0.149 (0.057)** −0.0629 (0.048)
PTV Democratic Party – 0.095 (0.045)** −0.162 (0.042)***
PTV Forza Italia – −0.080 (0.048)* 0.107 (0.039)***
PTV Five Star Movement – −0.170 (0.048)*** 0.162 (0.032)***
PTV Northern League – −0.060 (0.044) 0.054 (0.033)
Abstention/participation
Political involvement −0.949 (0.092)*** – –
Education 0.009 (0.119) – –
Labor market status: blue collar 0.619 (0.319)* – –
Age cohorts −0.185 (0.124) – –
Female −0.099 (0.156) – –
N 2673 2673 2673
RUM-consistent nested logistic regression. Maximum-likelihood estimated nested logit coefﬁ-
cients. Likelihood=−1731.0758. Likelihood ratio test for independence of irrelevant alter-
natives: P= 0.029. Base outcome for abstention/participation: Participation. The categories of
Labor Market Status are included, but not reported, for purpose of readability (reference
category: ‘employee, executive, professor, and teacher’). Robust SE in parentheses.
***P<0.01, **P<0.05, *P<0.1.
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increases as the respondent’s evaluation of the economy gets worse, has a negative and
statistically signiﬁcant effect on the probability of voting Yes, and a positive and
statistically signiﬁcant effect on the probability of votingNo. In other words, a negative
evaluation of the economywas able to both containing the likelihood of voting Yes and
fostering the likelihood of voting No. Thus, Hypothesis 2 is conﬁrmed.
Despite this, the heuristic offered by the Renzi cabinet had an impact on the Yes vote
only. Coherently with our third hypothesis, the better is respondent’s evaluation of the
Renzi cabinet, the more he/she is likely to vote Yes. However, as for the predictor
Content Evaluation, this mechanism does not explain the choice to vote No.
Partisan attachments play a key role in orienting respondents’ voting behavior.
All the indicators related to respondents’ propensity to vote for a given party
(i.e. PTV PD, PTV FI, PTVM5S), except for PTV LN, reach statistical signiﬁcance
in the expected directions. The more a respondent is ready to vote for PD in the next
future, the more (the less) he/she will be likely to vote Yes (No) in the constitutional
referendum. Conversely, respondents closer to FI and M5S parties, standing on the
No-side, are less likely to vote Yes andmore likely to vote No. Thus, despite with the
exception of LN, Hypothesis 4 is conﬁrmed.
Lastly, at the ﬁrst nest level, concerning the choicewhether to abstain or to take part in
the referendum, the negative coefﬁcient on the predictor Political Involvement indicates
that individuals are less likely to abstain for increasing values of political participation
and activism. Instead, the categorical control variableLaborMarket Status suggests that
individuals belonging to the ‘blue collar’ category have a higher propensity to abstain
than individuals working as ‘employee, executive, professor, and teacher’.
So far, our results propose that the systematic mode of information processing
explains the Yes vote fairly. However, being faced with a complex reform package,
respondents also employed heuristics and peripheral reasoning reasonably in order
to decide how to cast their ballots.
In what follows, we develop an exploratory analysis to understand whether such
peripheral dynamics also had conditioning effects on the impact of the predictor
Content Evaluation on respondents’ voting behavior as well. For instance, our results
highlight the key role played by economic voting. However, was a negative evaluation
of the economy (heuristic mode) able to nullify the effect of a positive evaluation of the
constitutional reform (systematic mode)? Furthermore, did respondents conform to the
views of their trusted parties (heuristic mode) even at the cost of neglecting their own
opinions on the reform package (systematic mode)? These questions can be answered
by estimating the effect of the predictor Content Evaluation on the probability of Yes
vote conditional on peripheral dynamics (i.e. Evaluation Economy, Evaluation Renzi
Cabinet and PTV for the four major Italian parties). Appendix Table A3 displays the
model speciﬁcations. Here we discuss the main ﬁndings.
Figure 2 shows that only partisan attachments are able to condition the effect of a
positive evaluation of the constitutional reform in a signiﬁcant and consistent way
(Brambor et al., 2006). Speciﬁcally, as the propensity to vote for FI and M5S
increases, the positive effects of the predictorContent Evaluation on the probability
Was Mattarella worth the trouble? 13
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of Yes vote decreases. Thus, partisan attachments not only affected voting choices
by their own, but they also diminished the positive effect on Yes vote given by
respondent’s agreement with the content of the reform.
Conclusions
In the 2016 constitutional referendum, voters decided how to cast their ballots
following both a systematic mode of information processing and cognitive shortcuts.
Figure 2 Effects of content evaluation on Yes vote conditional on partisan attachments to
Forza Italia (a) and the Five Star Movement (b).
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According to our results, respondents’ assessment of the content of the reform is a
key predictor of voting Yes. Notably, the systematic mode of information proces-
sing keeps its relevance even when the peripheral dynamics (i.e. the evaluation of the
state of the economy, the popularity of the Renzi government and partisan attach-
ments) are controlled for, highlighting that at the very least Yes voters were largely
driven by their personal positive evaluation of the reform.
Thus, good news for those who maintain that citizens take part in referendums to
express their sincere opinions on the issues at stake and that referendums are fun-
damental democratic instruments as, in case of success, they guarantee popular
legitimacy to radical policy changes (e.g. LeDuc, 2003; Qvortrup, 2005).
However, our results also highlight the effect on vote choices played by three
contextual dynamics, namely the retrospective evaluation of the economic situa-
tion, respondents’ evaluation of the Renzi cabinet and partisan attachments.
A negative evaluation of the state of the economy is a crucial factor in explaining
voting behavior. People having a negative judgment of the economic situation seem
more prone to vote No, and conversely less inclined to vote Yes. This result points
out how punishment strategies motivated by the economic downturn were at play
and strongly oriented the choices of No voters.
At the same time, individuals with a positive judgment of the Renzi cabinet were
more prone to vote Yes. The key role played by the evaluation of Renzi and his
cabinet in shaping vote choices is also underlined by Bellucci et al. (2017) and
Colombo et al. (2017).
Similarly, individuals that declared a high propensity to vote for PD were more
likely to vote Yes, and less prone to vote No than the supporters of the other parties.
Thus, those who strongly supported the PD followed former PM Renzi’s position
on the referendum.
However – a factor apparently underestimated by PM Renzi – citizens
who declared to be ready to vote for FI andM5S have been signiﬁcantly oriented by
their partisan attachments, being more prone to vote No and less inclined to
vote Yes.
Moreover, as our exploratory analysis on the conditioning effects of peripheral
dynamics shows, not only did partisan attachments affect voting choices, but they also
diminished the positive effect on Yes vote given by respondent’s agreement with the
content of the reform. Quite interestingly, among partisan attachments, the one that
seems unable to boost the positive effect of the predictor Content Evaluation on the
probability to vote Yes is the propensity to vote for PD. In fact, the most engaged party
on the Yes-side initially suffered from an internal division. The referendum activated a
well-established and never-faded intra-party cleavage between the mainstream faction
led by Renzi and the leftist factions, the ﬁrst claiming a stronger role for the executive
branch and a majoritarian electoral system, the latter supporting a parliamentary
regime and a proportional electoral system (Fasano et al., 2017). This intra-party het-
erogeneity was ﬁxed just 1month before the referendum thanks to an agreement on the
electoral law and is likely to have disoriented PD voters.
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Thus, the proponents of the heuristic mode of information processing in direct
democratic settings (e.g. Lodge and Taber, 2013; Taber and Young, 2013) can
breathe a sigh of relief: punishment strategies and partisan attachments played a
considerable role in the 2016 constitutional referendum.
At this referendum, the Yes-side collected about 13,500,000 (about 41%) votes.
Despite successful in mobilizing its electorate (i.e. PD collected about 8,700,000
votes at the 2013 Italian national elections, about 11,200,000 votes at the 2014
European Parliament elections), PD was largely defeated. Thus, the crucial strategic
mistake was that the PD was the only party on the Yes-side (with the negligible
contribution of minor NCD party).
The results suggest that Renzi’s attempt to use his image and the performance of
his cabinet to convince people to vote in favor of the reform has a positive impact on
Yes vote. However, this positive impact turned out to be lower than what he could
possibly expect.
In the light of referendum results, it is also plausible that Renzi overestimated the
initial appreciation of the content of the constitutional reform. This argument is
consistent with the study by Conti et al. (2017).
Ultimately, it is possible to claim that Renzi’s choice to infringe the so-called
Nazareno Pact with FI in order to elect PresidentMattarella is one of the factors that
determined the failure of the 2016 referendum, as it undermined the electoral bases
on the Yes-front. In fact, partisan attachments to FI have both a direct and a con-
ditioning negative effect on Yes vote.
WasMattarella worth the trouble? Our question sounds provocative, but it seems
hard to ignore that the infringement of the Nazareno Pact paved the way for the
failure of the 2016 constitutional referendum, thus seriously postponing a root and
branch overhaul of the constitution once again.
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Appendix
Table A1. Variables’ description
Name Sources and description
Voting behavior Multi-categorical dependent variable given by ITANES’s item D28
(Post-referendum wave)
Content evaluation Additive index given by ITANES’s items S26, S33.1, S33.2, S33.3, S33.4
(Pre-referendum wave) and D27.1 (Pre-referendum wave)
Evaluation economy ITANES’s variable S18 (Pre-referendum wave), rescaled
Evaluation Renzi
Cabinet
ITANES’s variable S20 (Pre-referendum wave)
Propensity to vote PD ITANES’s variable D35.1 (Post-referendum wave)
Propensity to vote FI ITANES’s variable D35.2 (Post-referendum wave)
Propensity to vote M5S ITANES’s variable D35.4 (Post-referendum wave)
Propensity to vote LN ITANES’s variable D35.5 (Post-referendum wave)
Political involvement Additive index given by ITANES’s items D16, D17, D18.1, D18.2, D18.7
(Post-referendum wave)
Education Ordinal variable derived from ITANES’s item S10 (Pre-referendum wave).
It is equal to:
1. No educational degree or elementary degree
2. Junior high school degree
3. High school degree
4. University degree or higher
Labor market status Categorical variable derived from ITANES’s items S11, S12, and S14
(Pre-referendum wave). It is equal to:
Employer, freelance, or director
Self-employed, shop keeper, sales agent, artisan
Employee, executive, professor, teacher (reference category)
Blue collar
Unemployed
Student
Housewife/maker
Retired person
Other
Age Ordinal variable derived from ITANES’s item S2 (Pre-referendum wave).
It is equal to:
1. 18–34 years old;
2. 35–54 years old;
3. 55 years old or more
Female Dummy variable derived from ITANES’s item S1 (Pre-referendum wave)
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Table A2. Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean Std. dev. Min. Max.
Voting behavior (categorical) 1.659 0.904 1 4
Content evaluation 5.137 2.471 0 10
Evaluation economy 6.06 2.204 0 10
Evaluation Renzi Cabinet 3.825 2.765 0 10
PTV PD 3.409 3.412 0 10
PTV FI 2.158 3.044 0 10
PTV M5S 3.660 3.673 0 10
PTV LN 2.465 3.396 0 10
Political involvement 3.195 0.847 0 5
Education 3.165 0.686 1 4
Labor market status (categorical) 4.562 2.368 1 9
Age 2.128 0.785 1 3
Female 0.479 0.499 0 1
Table A3. Determinants of Yes vote – conditional effects
M0 M1 M2
Content evaluation 0.397 (0.034)*** 0.353 (0.113)** 0.411 (0.065)***
Evaluation economy −0.005 (0.039) −0.049 (0.122) −0.005 (0.039)
Content evaluation× evaluation
economy
0.008 (0.018)
Evaluation Renzi Cabinet 0.295 (0.037)*** 0.295 (0.037)*** 0.314 (0.088)***
Content evaluation× evaluation
Renzi Cabinet
−0.003 (0.013)
PTV PD 0.195 (0.023)*** 0.196 (0.023)*** 0.195 (0.023)***
PTV FI −0.114 (0.029)*** −0.113 (0.029)*** −0.114 (0.029)***
PTV M5S −0.215 (0.020)*** −0.215 (0.020)*** −0.214 (0.020)***
PTV LN −0.076 (0.027)** −0.076 (0.027)** −0.076 (0.027)*
Control variables Yes Yes Yes
Constant Yes Yes Yes
N 2477 2477 2477
Pseudo R2 0.47 0.47 0.47
M3 M4 M5 M6
Content evaluation 0.426 (0.048)*** 0.479 (0.040)*** 0.445 (0.042)*** 0.433 (0.037)***
Evaluation economy −0.007 (0.039) −0.007 (0.039) −0.003 (0.039) −0.004 (0.039)
Evaluation Renzi Cabinet 0.297 (0.037)*** 0.299 (0.037)*** 0.298 (0.037)*** 0.299 (0.037)***
PTV PD 0.244 (0.063)*** 0.199 (0.023)*** 0.198 (0.023)*** 0.196 (0.023)***
Content evaluation× PTV PD −0.008 (0.009)
PTV FI −0.114 (0.029)*** 0.116 (0.065)* −0.114 (0.029)*** −0.112 (0.029)***
Content evaluation× PTV FI −0.038 (0.01)***
PTV M5S −0.214 (0.020)*** −0.213 (0.020)*** −0.122 (0.056)** −0.214 (0.020)***
Content evaluation× PTV M5S −0.016 (0.009)*
PTV LN −0.075 (0.027)** −0.074 (0.026)** −0.074 (0.027)* 0.027 (0.059)
Content evaluation× PTV LN −0.017 (0.009)*
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 2477 2477 2477 2477
Pseudo R2 0.47 0.48 0.47 0.47
Logit models. The outcome variable is equal to 1 if respondent took part in the 2016 constitutional referendum and voted
Yes, 0 otherwise. Robust SE in parentheses.
***P< 0.01, **P< 0.05, *P< 0.1.
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